Sep 21, 2010

Articles in journals

Garcia, F., Amir, R., Malgorzata K.

145

18

We develop a unified approach to symmetry-breaking in strategic models arising in industrial organization by constructing two general classes of two-player symmetric games that always possess only asymmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibria. These classes of games are characterized in some abstract sense by two general properties: payoff non-concavities and some form of strategic substitutability. Our framework relies on easily verified assumptions on the primitives of the game, and on the theory of supermodular games. To illustrate the generality and wide scope for application of our approach, we present some existing models dealing with R&D, capacity expansion and information provision.

Submodular Games,Endogenous Heterogeneity,Asymmetric Nash Equilibrium,Inter-firm Heterogeneity,Supermodular Games,